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We document a mechanism operating in complex adaptive systems leading to dynamical pockets of pre-
dictability (“prediction days”), in which agents collectively take predetermined courses of action, transiently
decoupled from past history. We demonstrate and test it out-of-sample on synthetic minority and majority
games as well as on real financial time series. The surprising large frequency of these prediction days implies a
collective organization of agents and of their strategies which condense into transitional herding regimes.
PACS numbers: 62.20.Mk; 62.20.Hg; 81.05.-t; 61.43.-j
The concept of complex adaptive feedbacks is in-
creasingly used to understand the earth climate, im-
mune systems, nervous systems, multicellular organ-
isms, insect societies, ecologies, economies, human
societies, stock markets, distributed computing sys-
tems, large-scale communication networks. A trade-
mark of such systems is the occurrence of extreme
events, which are in general believed to be unpre-
dictable [1]. However, a few recent works suggest a
degree of predictability in some cases, for instance as-
sociated with transient herding phases in the popula-
tion of agents [2], or signaled by empirical patterns [3].
Previous attempts to examine the predictability of large
future changes have used models of evolving agents
competing for a limited resource [4, 5]. These agents
have memory and use complex (possibly learning) al-
gorithms. Although they can show predictive power,
the complexity of agent-based models has not provided
an understanding of the factors that lead to the predic-
tions except to say that they are a consequence of the
information incoded in the system’s global state [5].
This is particularly problematic for concrete applica-
tions for which predictions become credible and usable
only when based upon a sound physical understanding
of their limitations and of the range and likelihood of
competing scenarios.
Let us consider a generic multi-agent system com-
prising a population of N agents of which less than
half of the agents can win at each time step. Each agent
will thus seek to be in the minority group. In [6], it is
was shown that, for such Minority Games (MG), it is
the information common to all the agents, rather than
the feedback of their actions onto the price, which de-
termines the dynamics of the game. Here, we extend
this observation and show the surprising fact that, for
minority as well as for majority games [8], at certain
times, the information contained in a few last moves
becomes irrelevant in the agents’ decision making, a
situation that we refer to as “decoupling.” This leads
to dynamical pockets of predictability, with agents tak-
ing a predetermined course of action which is decou-
pled from the price history of the system over a finite
number of time steps. We are able to unveil the origin
of these pockets of predictability that we test out-of-
sample on synthetic as well as on real financial time
series using a suitably calibrated agent-based model.
Our results apply to systems which can be repre-
sented by agent-based models, in which each agent
i has a finite memory over mi time steps fed to his
si strategies. Without significant loss of generality,
we follow most previous models [7] and assume that
mi = m and si = s for all agents. At each time
step t, each of the N agents makes either a decision
aµmi (t) = ±1 (yes or no, itinary A or B, buy or sell,
etc.) using his best (among the s) strategy or does noth-
ing, based on the available information of the last m
time steps. The available common information µm(t)
at time t is the series of past total actions of all the
agents over the last m time steps
µm(t) = {
1 + sign[Aµ(k)]
2
; k = t−m+ 1, ..., t} ,
(1)
where Aµ(k) =
∑
i a
µ
i (k). Thus, µm(t) is a string
of m binary digits 0 (a majority of agents played −1)
or 1 (a majority of agents played +1). A strategy is a
mapping from the 2m possible price histories onto the
two possible decisions. An example of a strategy with
m = 3 is
{000→ 0; 001→ 0; 010→ 1; 011→ 0;
100→ 1; 101→ 0; 110→ 1; 111→ 0} . (2)
Different payoffs of strategies define different mech-
anisms and apply to distinct situations. The standard
2MG corresponds to the payoff gj(t) = −aj(t)A(t): if
a strategy j is in the minority (aj(t)A(t) < 0), it is re-
warded. In other words, agents in the MG try to be anti-
imitative. Another payoff, for instance motivated by
real financial markets, is [8, 9] gj(t) = aj(t− 1)A(t).
In this case, the price is an increasing function of the
excess demand A(t) and the payoff reflects the ten-
dency for a strategy to win if it has anticipated correctly
the next market move. Our results apply equally well
to these two as well as other payoffs.
Given the common information µm(t) at time t, we
define the process of decoupling of a strategy as fol-
lows:
• A strategy sj is called n−time steps decoupled con-
ditioned on µm(t) if the action sj(µm(t+n+1)) does
not depend on µm(t+ 1), ..., µm(t+ n).
• A strategy si(µm(t + n + 1)), whose action at time
t + n + 1 depends on at least one of the outcomes of
µm(t+1), ..., µm(t+n), is coupled to the information
flow.
As an example, consider the strategy (2). This strategy
is one-time step decoupled conditioned on µ3(t) = 000
or µ3(t) = 100 since, in both realisations µ3(t + 1) =
000 or µ3(t + 1) = 001, the strategy’s action is 0 at
time t + 2. More generally, a strategy s with m = 3
is one-step decoupled conditioned on the common in-
formation µ3(t) = abc if s(bc0) = s(bc1). It is then
automatically decoupled conditioned on µ3(t) = a¯bc
where a¯ = 1 if a = 0 and a¯ = 0 if a = 1.
The fraction of one-step decoupled strategies condi-
tioned on having only one pair (abc, a¯bc) decoupled is(
4
1
)
2−4 = 1/4, since there are four possible pairs (bc)
each having a probability 1/2 that s(bc0) = s(bc1).
The strategy s is two-step decoupled conditioned on
µ3(t) = abc if s(c00) = s(c01) = s(c10) = s(c11).
For the general m memory case, a strategy is one-
step decoupled conditioned on µm(t) = c1c2...cm if
s(c2...cm0) = s(c2...cm1). The fraction of one-step
decoupled strategies on at least one pair of histories is
1 − 2−2
m−1
, which is one minus the probability that
none among the number 2m−1 of (m − 1)-plets obey
s(c2...cm0) = s(c2...cm1). A strategy is n-step decou-
pled (with n ≤ m) if s(cn+1...cm{µn}) is independent
of all possible 2n histories {µn} of string length n. The
fraction of n-step decoupled strategies conditioned on
any (m − n)-plets only is 1 − (1 − 2−(2n−1))2m−n ,
because 2−(2n−1) is the probability for a given his-
tory to be n-step decoupled, thus 1 − 2−(2n−1)) is the
probability to be n-step coupled and there are 2m−n
(m− n)-plets. Thus, as soon as n becomes larger than
≈ ln2(m), the n-step decoupled strategies become ex-
tremely rare.
What is interesting about decoupled strategies is that
they open the possibility that one can predict with
certainty[10] the future global action in two (or more)
time steps ahead without having to know it at the next
time step. This occurs when a majority of agents use
decoupled strategies which combine to a majority ac-
tion. Indeed, the common action of all the agents at
time t + n + 1 can be written as the sum of two con-
tributions, one stemming from coupled and the other
from decoupled strategies (conditioned on the history
µm(t)):
Aµm(t) ≡ A
µm(t)
coupled +A
µm(t)
decoupled . (3)
The condition for certain predictability n time steps
ahead is therefore
|A
µm(t)
decoupled(t+ n+ 1)| > N/2 . (4)
We call these times when condition (4) is met “predic-
tion days.”
It is interesting to estimate the frequency of such pre-
diction days that would be obtained if strategies and
histories were randomly chosen. Let us first estimate
the probability Pr1 that a given agent is n-step decou-
pled. This is the probability that he is active and that
his best strategy is n-step decoupled. The former is a
fixed finite fraction 0 < η < 1 of time. The proba-
bility that his best strategy is n-step decoupled is the
product of the probability that his best strategy belongs
to the set of possibly n-step decoupled strategies times
the probability that the present history is decoupling for
that strategy. The former is 1− (1− 2−(2n−1))2m−n as
shown above. The later is 1/22n−1, which is the prob-
ability for 2n values s(cn+1...cm{µn}) to be equal for
all 2n histories {µn}. This gives
Pr1(m,n) = η
[
1−
(
1−
1
22n−1
)2m−n]
1
22n−1
.
We have for instance Pr1(m = 3, n = 1) = 3η/8;
Pr1(m = 3, n = 2) = 11η/216, Pr1(m → +∞, n =
1) → η/2 from below, and Pr1(m,n) < η/2 for all
n ≤ m.
Assuming complete incoherence between the strate-
gies and histories, the probability Prpred that condition
(4) is met is
Prpred = 2
N∑
D=N
2
[Pr1]
D
D∑
D+>
D
2
+N
4
(
D
D+
)
1
2D
(5)
where D is the number of active decoupled agents and
D+ is the number among them who take a positive
step. The factor 2 comes from the two possible signs
of Aµm(t)decoupled. The lower bound
D
2 +
N
4 < D+ in the
second sum ensures that condition (4) is obeyed. The
lower bound D = N/2 in the first sum expresses the
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FIG. 1: Adecoupled defined in (3) as a function of time for the
MG with N = 101, s = 12,m = 3. Circles indicate one-
step prediction days, crosses are the subset of days starting a
run of two or more consecutive one-step prediction days.
obvious fact that condition (4) is met when the number
of decoupled agents is at least N/2 (this lower bound
is reached when they all agree). Now, the second sum
is obviously bounded from above by 1. This yields
Prpred <
2Pr
N/2
1
1− Pr1
<
4
2− η
(η
2
)N/2
<
4
2N/2
, (6)
where the two last bounds use the fact that
Pr1(m,n) < η/2 < 1/2 for all n,m. This result
(6) shows that in this scenario, as soon as one con-
siders populations of agents of the order of a few tens
or more, the probability to find a prediction day is ex-
ceedingly small. In our simulations below, we have
used N = 25 and N = 101, which gives respectively
Prpred < 7 · 10
−4 and Prpred < 2.5 · 10−15.
Figure 1 shows a typical time series of Adecoupled
as a function of time for the standard MG with N =
101, s = 12,m = 3. When strategies are randomized
at each time step, there are no prediction day as es-
pected from our above estimated probability (6) which
applies to this case and Adecoupled remains confined
around zero within the strip delineated by the two hori-
zontal lines at ±20. In constrast, Fig. 1 shows a sur-
prisingly large fraction ρpred = 17.5% for one-step
prediction days and 3.5% for two or more consecutive
days which are predictive. This implies that the predic-
tion days result from a collective organization of agents
and of their strategies which condense into a herding
regime characterized by a rather strong synchroniza-
tion of both their decoupling and of their action condi-
tioned on decoupling.
By scanning different values for the number s of
strategies per agent and for the memory m, figure 2
shows that the new phenomenon discovered here is a
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FIG. 2: θ ≡ 〈sign[A]〉2 and the frequency of predictive days,
ρpred versus α ≡ 2
m/N . Simulations for θ were done with
s = 2, m = 5 (+), m = 6 (diamonds), m = 7 (black
dots). Simulations for ρpredictive were done with N = 25,
s = 7 (squares), s = 8 (crosses), s = 9 (circles), s = 12
(triangles).
robust property of MG. We also compare the occur-
rence of our prediction days with a measure of pre-
dictability θ ≡ 〈sign[Aµ]〉2 introduced by Savit et al.
[11], where 〈sign[Aµ]〉 is the time-average of the col-
lective action conditioned upon the occurrence of a
given history µ, while the upper bar denotes the av-
erage over all possible histories. Previous works (see
also figure 2) have shown that there is a critical value
αc ≈ 0.35 (where α ≡ 2m/N ) such that θ goes from
non-zero (statistically predictable regime) for α > αc
to zero (statistically unpredictable regime) for α < αc.
Our simulations illustrate a case where our prediction
days are in fact more frequent in the previously classi-
fied “statistically unpredictable” regime, showing that
we are dealing with a fundamentally different property.
Note that ρpred grows as α decreases, i.e., when m de-
creases and N increases, in blatant contradiction with
the expectations (5) assuming incoherent and random
choices. Again, this reinforces the evidence that the
prediction days results from a special herding organi-
zation of the strategies in conjunction with the realized
histories.
A major objection could be raised that the informa-
tion required for identifying a prediction day includes,
not only the common knowledge of past history but,
the active strategies used by the agents, which are in
general unobservable. Actually, it is possible to re-
trieve sufficient information on the strategies by using
a methodology derived from Lamper et al. [5], which
allows one to invert a time series of observable col-
lective action A(t) generated by a black-box game to
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FIG. 3: Fat dashed line: Nasdaq Composite price history
(black-box game) as a function of time (days); thin solid
lines: ten predicted price trajectories obtained from the third-
party games. The first in-sample 61 days are used to calibrate
ten third-party games. The days 62-123 are out-of-sample.
The third-party games make a poor job at predicting the out-
of-sample prices of the Nasdaq Composite index, while table
1 shows that they predict specific pockets of predictability
associated with forecasted “prediction days” (see text).
obtain an ensemble of so-called third-party games by
optimizing a measure of the matching between the ob-
served time series and synthetic time series generated
with the third-party games [12]. It is then possible to
identify the prediction days in the third-party games.
To quantify how these prediction days by third-party
games provide a forecast for the black-box game, we
use as a metric the success rate to forecast the cor-
rect sign of the global action A on a prediction day
identified by the third-party games compared with the
success rate on other days. In particular, we monitor
how these success rates vary with the predicted ampli-
tude of Adecoupled, since expression (3) shows that the
larger it is, the more predictable is the global action.
We find that, for both the MG as well as for the major-
ity $-game [8], the former success rate shows the pre-
dicted behavior of increasing monotonically from 50%
for small Adecoupled to 100% for large Adecoupled. In
contrast, we do not observe any significant prediction
skill above 50% on non-prediction days. Rather than
reporting these results in details on synthetic MG and
$ games, we now show that our method works for real
complex system of competing agents, and we take the
stock market as a significant application. We use the re-
turn time series of the Nasdaq Composite index as the
proxy for the global action A(t), whose price trajec-
tory is shown in figure 3. We construct ten third-party
$-games (with the same parameters but different real-
|A| 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
% 53 61 67 65 82 70 67 67 100 100
Nb 62 49 39 23 17 10 6 3 2 1
TABLE I: Out-of-sample success rate % (second row) using
different thresholds for the predicted global decoupled action
(first row) of the third-party $-games calibrated to the Nasdaq
Composite index. Nb (third row) is the number of days from
t = 62 to 123 which have their predicted global decoupled
action |Adecoupled| larger than the value indicated in the first
row.
izations of strategies endowed to the agents) calibrated
on the first 61 daily returns to the left of the vertical
dashed line in figure 3. We then feed to these third-
party games the realized returns of the Nasdaq Com-
posite and compare their predictions with the realized
price. The predictions are issued at each close of the
day for the next close, all third-party games being un-
changed for the test over the second part of the time pe-
riod from t = 62 to 123. Among the 62 out-of-sample
days, we monitor our ten third-party games to detect a
prediction day (we use a voting process among the ten
third-party games to obtain better robustness), accord-
ing to the active strategies and the predicted one-step
ahead history for the next close. Conditioned on the
detection of a prediction day, we issue a prediction of
the sign of the next day return and compare it with the
realized market return. The performance of this pre-
diction scheme is reported in table 1 which is typical
of our results. The important point is that the success
rate (% in the table) increases with the predicted ampli-
tude of Adecoupled, as for the synthetic MG and $-game
mentioned above.
In contrast, the use of the third-party games for pre-
dicting each day the sign of the next return fails, as can
be seen from the ten trajectories in the out-of-sample
time interval. Our method has thus identified pock-
ets of predictability in the Nasdaq index associated
with the prediction of ensembles of decoupled strate-
gies predicted by the third-party games.
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